How Political Competition and Political Institutions Influence Inflation: Empirical Evidence from Developing Countries
Abstract
The study empirically explores the impact of political competition and political institutions on inflation rates in emerging economies, taking into account political institutions' moderating role. This study examined data from 57 developing countries spanning 2000 to 2018.The empirical analysis was performed using a two-step System Generalized Method of Moments (system-GMM) estimation technique. The analysis yields two key findings. In a democratic regime, effective competition among politicians lowers inflation. However, the effect of political competition on inflation is conditional on political institutions. Nations with strong institutional structure and balanced competition are associated with better inflation performance.
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References
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